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Notes
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS - EXTINCTION BY ACQUIESCENCE IN
VIOLATIONS-A building restriction in a large subdivision pro-
vided the directions in which houses on corner lots should face.
When the defendant began construction of a house facing a side
street, certain neighbors sought to restrain him from breaching
the restriction. Held, the plaintiffs had lost their right to com-
plain by their failure to object when similar violations had occur-
red in the construction of every other corner house on the street.
Plaintiffs' right to an injunction was made to depend on the num-
ber of violations in the immediate neighborhood. Emphasis was
placed upon the situation on the particular street. Edwards v.
Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So. (2d) 661 (1941).
Building restrictions have been sanctioned in Louisiana un-
der the freedom of contract doctrine." For rules of application,
'Louisiana courts have resorted to the law of equitable restrictions
running with the land.2 The principal case is in harmony with
the decisions of other states. Since the English case of Tulk v.
Moxhay,8 building restrictions have been enforced at equity
whether or not they met the technical requirements of covenants
running with the land.4 Accordingly, equitable defenses come
into play whenever a complainant seeks to enjoin a breach of the
restrictions.2 In balancing equities, courts consistently refuse to
enforce a restriction whenever a change of conditions within' or
without7 the restricted area render the purpose of the scheme un-
1. Arts. 1764, 2013, 709, La. Civil Code of 1870. Queensborough Land Co. v.
Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A. 1916B 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D 1248 (1915)
(prohibition of alienation of land to negroes was upheld).
2. Hill v. Ross, 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928); Ouachita Home Site &
Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938).
3. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Reprint 1143 (1848).
4. Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run with Land"
(1929) 148-165; McClintock, Handbook of Equity (1936) 213-224, § 120-124;
Tiffany, A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Inter-
ests in Land (1940) 592-599, §§ 582-587; 7 Thompson, Commentaries on the
Modern Law of Real Property (perm. ed. 1940) 104, § 3615; Note (1928) 6
N.C.L. Rev. 308.
5. See authorities cited supra note 4.
6. Schwartz v. Holycross, 83 Ind. App. 658, 149 N.E. 699 (1925); Miller v.
Ettinger, 235 Mich. 527, 209 N.W. 568 (1926). Compare Kokenge v. Whetstone,
60 Ohio App. 302, 20 N.E. (2d) 965 (1938) (a few violations on border lots had
not changed the nature of the restricted area).
7. Starkey v. Garner, 194 N.C. 74, 138 S.E. 408, 54 A.L.R. 806 (1927). Com-
pare Downs v. Koeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927); Moore v. Curry, 176
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attainable. The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized this rule in
Hill v. Ross."
There are still other equitable defenses. In some cases, the
complainant is said to be estopped because he has violated the
same restrictions that he seeks to enforceY In other cases, the
complainant loses his power to demand an injunction by his fail-
ure to object to other violations near him;10 he is deemed to have
waived his privilege by acquiesence. Such is the decision of the
principal case. But a complainant does not lose his privilege of
enjoining violations near him merely because he fails to object
to violations in more distant parts of the subdivision.1 As in the
principal case, the fact that a restriction has lost its efficacy in one
part of the restricted area does not necessarily render it unen-
forceable in another part. Many of the decisions are controlling
only in respect to the particular lots in controversy.1 2
It is interesting to observe how the courts of Louisiana came
to apply the rules of equitable restrictions. In Queensborough
Land Company v. CazeauxI a stipulation in a conveyance that
the land should not be sold to negroes and further that this "cove-
nant" should run with the land was held to create a real obliga-
tion. Whether such a real obligation amounted to a servitude was
not discussed.14 In the later case of Hill v. Ross,15 the court incor-
rectly cited the Queensborough case as holding that building re-
Mich. 456, 142 N.W. 839 (1913). See Notes (1927) 16 Calif. L. Rev. 58, (1928)
54 A.L.R. 812.
8. 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
9. Kneip v. Schroeder, 255 Ill. 621, 99 N.E. 617 (1912); McGovern v.
Brown, 317 Ill. 73, 147 N.E. 664 (1925). See Nashua Hospital Ass'n v. Gage,
85 N.H. 335, 159 Atl. 137 (1932). Compare O'Neill v. Wolff, 338 Ill. 508, 170 N.E.
669 (1930) ("de minimis" doctrine was applied).
10. Bowen v. Whilden, 98 N.J. Eq. 140, 130 Atl. 1 (1925); Russell v. Har-
pel, 20 Ohio C.C. 127, 10 Ohio Cir. Dec. 732 (1900).
11. Goulding t. Phinney, 234 Mass. 411, 125 N.E. 703 (1920); Voorheis v.
Powell, 261 Mich. 378, 246 N.W. 154, 85 A.L.R. 932 (1933); Brigham v. H. G.
Mulock Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 287, 70 Atl. 185 (1908); Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp.,
188 Wis. 534, 206 N.W. 856, 46 A.L.R. 364 (1926).
12. See Downs v. Koeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927); McClintock,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 223-224, § 124.
13. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A. 1916B 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D 1248 (1915).
See Comment (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 262. See also Female Orphan Society
v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 119 La. 278, 44 So. 15, 12 Ann. Cas. 811 (1907),
holding a condition of perpetual inalienability to be void as against public
policy.
14. Nevertheless it might be inferred that the limitation was considered a
servitude because Article 709 was used to limit the freedom of contracting
real obligations to those not contrary to good morals. 136 La. at 733, 67 So. at
644.
15. 166 La. 581, 117. So. 725 (1928).
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strictions were covenants running with the land.e Upon that
basis, Louisiana courts have adopted the building restriction rules
of common law jurisdictions.
Although Louisiana courts may continue to adhere to the
rules of equitable restrictions,"7 it is very difficult to reconcile
these rules with the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code relating
to servitudes. The first paragraph of Article 75618 provides:
"If the right granted be of a nature to assure a real advan-
tage to an estate, it is to be presumed that such right is a real
servitude, although it may not be so styled."
The section of Toullier from which Article 75611 was taken2
indicates even more clearly that all real rights imposed in favor of
another estate are to be considered as servitudes. Building re-
strictions should fall within the purview both of Article 745,21
relating to multiple servitudes, and Article 746,22 which defines
reciprocal servitudes and provides that the rules of simple servi-
tudes shall apply. Under the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, the methods of extinguishing servitudes provided by
Articles 783-82223 should be exclusive.
16. 166 La. at 583-584, 117 So. at 726:
"In Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A.
1916B 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1248, it was held that such restrictions, in con-
tracts between individuals, are not unlawful in this state; that they are not
personal to the vendor but inure to the benefit of all other grantees under a
general plan of development, and are covenants running with the land; that
the remedy of the other grantees is by injunction to prevent a violation of
the restrictions by any of them." (Italics supplied.)
17. In the instant case, for example, counsel for plaintiffs vainly urged
that these rules had no place in the civil law of Louisiana-that the rules of
servitudes should apply. The point was not discussed in the opinion of the
court. The dictum of Hill v. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 583-584, 117 So. 725-726
(1928) kas affirmed in Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521,
179 So. 841 (1938).
18. La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Ibid.
20. See 1 Louisiana Legal Archives 83 (1937). Redactors' annotation refers
to 3 Toullier, Droit Civil, 495, no 588. The section of Toullier makes the ad-
ditional statement: "This giving of a name to the right is not necessary,
since every service imposed upon an estate in favor of another estate is es-
sentially a servitude." Found also in 2 Toullier, Droit Civil Frangais (ed.
1833) 167, no 588. For a comparison of Articles 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, La.
Civil Code of 1870, with the same section of Toullier see Provosty's concur-
ring opinion in Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 59 So. 403,
419-421 (La. 1912).
21. La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. La. Civil Code of 1870. Prescription and abandonment would be the
two means of extinction most readily available for application. The prescrip-
tion of ten years established by Articles 789, 790, La. Civil Code of 1870 has
been shortened to two years by Act 326 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2062.3-
2062.4]. See discussion in Hebert and Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of 1938
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It is submitted that the court should apply the rules of con-
ventional servitudes to building restrictions rather than import a
body of law which is regarded as confused even against its natural
common law background.2 Very little hardship would be occa-
sioned by rejecting the rules of equitable restrictions running
with the land. Act 326 of 193821 has reduced prescription against
contractual building restrictions to two years; thereby giving our
rules of servitudes a commercial practicability which they lacked
at the time Hill v. Ross" was decided. In addition, instruments
containing restrictions in Louisiana are usually drawn up by
lawyers who are familiar with the rules of civil law property. If
the parties wish to include additional methods of extinction of the
restrictions, there is no legal impediment. 27
R.B.L.
CORPORATIONS-Ex PARTE APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY RE-
CEIVER-RECEIVERSHIP-In a stockholder's action for the appoint-
ment of a receiver of a defunct corporation the trial court
appointed a temporary receiver without complying with the
necessary formalities set forth in the Louisiana general receiver-
ship statute, Act 159 of 1898, as to notice, hearing, and recorda-
tion of the order appointing the receiver for ten days on the
receivership order book. The appellant questioned the authority
of the court to make such an ex parte appointment. The court
held that since Louisiana courts had appointed receivers through
the exercise of their inherent power prior to any statutory con-
trol, and there was no express provision in the general receiver-
ship statute forbidding the appointment of a temporary receiver,
the courts retained the power to appoint an ex parte temporary
receiver subsequent to the passage of the statute. Foster v.
Koretke Brass & Manufacturing Company, Limited, 3 So. (2d)
668 (La. 1941).
(1938) 1 LOUisiANA LAW Rsvmw 80, 112-114. On the other hand the extinction
by tacit renunciation has remained a narrow concept due to the requirement
of express verbal or written permission to build works presupposing annihila-
tion of the servitudes. Lavillebeuvre v. Cosgrove, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858).
24. For an excellent enumeration and analysis of the many conflicting
theories of equitable restrictions see Clark, op. cit. supra note 4, at 148-165.
25. Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 2062.3-2062.4.
26. 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
27. Second paragraph of Art. 709, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The use and ex-
tent of servitudes thus established are regulated by the title by which they
are granted, and if there be no title, by the following rules."
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